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ABSTRACT. Cryptosystem GOST belongs to DES-like cryptosystems. GOST 
has been published in [Sistemy obrabotki informacii. Zashchita kryptografich-
eskaya, Algoritm kriptograficheskogo preobrazovaniya. Gosudarstvennyi Stan-
dart Soyuza SSR. GOST: 28147-89, IPK Izdatelstvo standartov, Moskva, 1989], 
and partially analyzed in [CHARNES, C—- O 'CONNOR, L.—PIEPRZYK, J.— 
SAFAVI-NAINI, R. ZHENG, Y.: Comments on Soviet encryption algorithm. 
Preprint, April 29, 1994]. 
In this paper we analyze fix points of GOST-algorithm. It is known tha t there 
exist 2 3 2 fix points when a weak key is in use in this algorithm . But we have 
never seen any proof of this fact. So we give our brief proof of this property . 
Using polynomial analysis we show an exact form of these fix points when zero 
key is active (note that zero key is also a weak key), and all S-boxes are identity 
permutat ions . As far as we know such an approach has not been used yet. 
1. Preliminaries 
Cryptosystem GOST has been published in [2]. In the present time we know 
some other papers concerning this algorithm: [1], [3], [5], [6], [7]. Papers [3] 
and [G] present only a brief description of GOST-algorithm. Paper [5] treats a 
special kind of cryptanalysis of GOST (key-schedule cryptanalysis). In [7] one 
can find, besides description of GOST, also general differences of GOST and 
DES algorithms. Only one paper which gives first results of cryptanalysis of 
GOST-algorithm [1] appears in the open literature. Another paper [4] has been 
submitted to a computer journal. 
Algorithm GOST is a block cipher which can operate in some different modes 
We analyse this algorithm in its basic mode, namely in ECB mode (Electronic 
Code Book). Note that in this mode GOST transforms 64-bits input block to 
G4-bits output block in 32 rounds. Besides secret 25G-bits of a key, GOST 
2000 M a t h e m a t i c s S u b j e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Pr imary 68P25, 94A60. 
K e y w o r d s : GOST, fix point, cryptanalysis. 
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exploits 8 secret 4 x 4 bijective substitution boxes (S-boxes) . One can find 
details of GOST-algorithm in above mentioned papers. 
2. Basic notions 
Denote ciphering using GOST-algorithm under actual key K G Z 2 5 6 and 
S-boxes 5 1 9 . . - , 5 8 by GOSTK Si Sg: if -> Z
6
2
4 where S •: Z\ -> Z 4 , i = 
1 , . . . , 8 . 
To analyse algorithm GOST we use polynomials. Arbitrary string of 32 bits 
can be considered as a polynomial of the degree at most 31 . To be sharp a 32 bits 
string ( a 3 1 , a 3 0 , . . . , a0) can be considered as a polynomial a0®a1-x®- • •®a31-.r
31 
over Z 2 , or element of commutative ring Z2[x] modulo (x
32 ® 1) with standard 
operations "XOR" and "AND". Denote this ring of polynomials by AC. 
GOST-algorithm works in 32 rounds. In all rounds GOST transforms 64-bits 
input tuple to 64-bits output tuple using actual 32-bits subkey. Main 256-bit 
key is divided into eight subkeys which are used in order Kx,..., K8< Kx,..., Ks , 
KX,...,K8,KS,...,KX. 
In each round input tuple is divided into two halves. The right half and actual 
subkey act as input of round function. The output and the left half are XORed 
to produce new right half and the right half becomes new left half. After last 
round two halves are swapped. Round function consists of addition modulo 232 
of the right half and actual subkey. After using eight S-boxes (each S-box is a 
permutation of the numbers 0 through 15) a 32-bit word is rotated by 11 bits 
to the left. 
. L„ PM 
-< F < 
T • 
Li Pi 
F I G U R E 1. ith round of algorithm GOST. 
For i = 1 , . . . ,32 , let L•, and Pi be left and right 32 output bits of ith 
round. Denote by L0, and P0 left and right 32 input bits of the first round (i.e. 
of a plaintext). There is one round of GOST-algorithm in Figure 1 with round 
function denoted by F. Only exception is last round where swap of halves is 
omitted. Note that Ll5 P x , . . . , L32,P32 G K. This means that transformation 
GOST can also be considered as a function from /C x K to /C x /C. 
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Further, let for i = 1, 2, 3,4, L2i~l, and P 2 *" 1 be left and right half of the 
output after 8 • i rounds. Let L 2 ^ - 1 ) , and P 2 ^ - 1 ) be left and right half of the 
input to [8(z — 1) + l] th round (see Figure 2). Note that subkeys are used in 
reverse order in the last eight rounds. 
A fix point of GOST-algorithm is an element (L, P ) £ /C x /C which satisfies 
GOST(L,P) = (L,P). (1) 
к, 
, *• , 
ń ń 
F I G U R E 2. Algorithm G O S T . 
3. Fix points under a weak key 
It is clear (from the description of GOST-algorithm) that for subkeys K1,... 
, , Ks satisfying 
Kr=K8, K2=K7, K3 = K6, K4 = K5 
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deciphering is equal to ciphering. Moreover, for any 5-box S1,..., Ss (denoted 




DEFINITION 1. Keys with derived subkeys satisfying (2) are called weak keys 
of algorithm GOST. 
THEOREM 1. There exist 232 fix points of GO ST-algorithm when a weak key 
is in use. 
Although this fact is known we have never seen any proof of previous theorem. 
We give our one. 
P r o o f . From Figure 2 it is clear that for fix points (i.e. (L°,P°) = 
( L 7 , P 7 ) ) of GOST-algorithm it holds that 
(L\Pl) = {L*,P«). (3) 
But when a weak key is in use, then Kx = K8, K2 = K7, K3 = K6, K4 = K5. 
From Figure 2 it follows that 
(L\P3) = (L\Pi) (4) 
and 
L3=P4 k L4 = P3. (5) 
From (4) and (5) we have 
i 3 = P3 . (6) 
Thus (L°,P°) is a fix point of GOST-algorithm if and only if property (6) 
holds. Equation (6) has exactly 232 solutions. Hence there exist exactly 232 fix 
points of GOST-algorithm. • 
4. P o l y n o m i a l analys i s 
It is very difficult to handle with 32 bits during analysis. For this reason we 
use polynomial analysis. As far as we know such an approach has not been used 
yet. 
Suppose now that the key is all the zeroes string, and all S-boxes are identity 
permutations in GOST-algorithm. It is clear (from the description of round 
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function of algorithm GOST — see e.g. [2]) that the round function F is only 
11 bits rotation to the highest significant bit now. Thus 
F(P) = x 1 1 • P for any P 6 K. (7) 
From Figure 1 and (7) it follows that 
L1=L0©x
11.P0 & ^ i = ^ o - (
8 ) 
We can summarize (8) in a matrix form as 
L,\ _ fl xll\ (L„ 
A) V° 1 J \Po) ' ^ 
From Figure 1 and (7), for i = 1, . . . , 31 it follows that 
L m = P i © x
1 1 - L i & Pi+1=Lt. (10) 
Again, in a matrix form 
Li+A tx
1 1 1 
PІ+J W V\pi 
From (9) and (11) we have 
After reduction in ring /C, from (12) we obtain 
T \ f -21 -8 m -10 m ~16 ffs -20 \ ( j 
Loo \ I «L J b K j p X K j j X K U ^ \ l L-'f) 
P32)




Thus a fix point (L,P) must satisfy 
(x21 © 1)L © (x8 © x1 0 © x1 6 © x 2 0 ) P = 0 , (14) 
(1 © x8 © x1 0 © x1 6 © x 2 0 ) L © (x21 © 1)P = 0 . (15) 
Recall that (x32 © 1) = (x © l ) 3 2 and (1 © x8 © x10 © x16 © x20) = (1 © x4 © 
x5 0 x8 © x 1 0 ) 2 . Moreover, (1 © x4 © x5 © x8 © x10) is irreducible polynomial. 
Hence there exists an inverse polynomial to (1 © x8 © x1 0 © x1 6 © x 2 0 ) , namely 
(1 © x2 © x3 © x4 © x5 © x6 © x 7 ) 2 ( l © x © x6 © x7 © x 8 ) 2 . Thus 
L = ( l © x 2 © x 3 © x 4 © x 5 © x 6 © x 7 ) 2 ( l © x © x 6 © x 7 © x 8 ) 2 ( x 2 1 © 1 ) P . (16) 
From here and (14) it follows 
(1 © x2 © x3 © x4 © x5 © x6 © x 7 ) 2 (1 © x © x6 © x7 © x8)2-
• (x21 © 1 ) 2 P © (x8 © x1 0 © x1 6 © x 2 0 ) P = 0 . 
587 
MARCEL ZANECHAL 











































-f -f тf co н н 
-f -f 


















ю ю ю н 
t-





н н н 
ю 
H 
t- i- 00 ю н н н «э 
t- t-
н н н «э 
н 




н o o 
н н н 
CN «_ Oì c. o. Cí o. oo o. 
H t-
н 









o o o rH rH CN rH o o CN -f t-
00 Cî o. 
H H H н н н н н н н н н н н н 
© 




н "н "н "н "н н "н "н "н н н 1. 
г
~н "н 
CN rн •-j1 co co co co -f -f CO co <N ю «_ o. 
o. 
н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
® 
o co CN ю yэ -f тf ю ю «, УЭ •-f ю t- t- o Cł 
H H н H н н н н н н н н н н н н 
rн -# co «_ t- ю ю «э «_ t- t- ю ю o. 00 _н CN 
н н H н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
CN ю ю t- 00 УЭ «_ t- t- 00 00 «э t- o o. CN CN CN 
н H н TJI H н н C 
н 
н н <N 
н 





н н CN 
н 







C. oo oo o. o. c. o. 00 co 
«_ 




н н н H н «_ 
н 
н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
э 
-f t- 00 o _H rH o o. o rH o o o <N o o. CN CN rH «_ -f CN <N 00 CN 
«_ 
<N CN CN CN CN CN CN CN 
н «_ н н H H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
ю 00 o <N CN <N o -H o o rH co <N co rH •-f CN <N "->• -f CN 00 ю 
oo CN CN <N <N CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN 
H H H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
«, o o co -J
1 
--f co <N <N rH тf CN ю «э -f co «_ co co «_ ю co o УЭ CN CN CN CN <N CN CN CN !—1 CN <N CN CN CN CN <N <N 
н "н H H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
1—1 
т—1 
ю <N rн ю «_ ю <-D <x> co CN «_ co «_ 00 ю t- o -f ю oo «_ ю CN t-<N CN CN <N <N <N -f CN CN <N CN 00 CN <N CN CN CN -f CN CN CN 
н н н -f н H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
«_ -f тf t- 00 t- t- 00 -f CN «_ o тf t- <N t- <N 00 CN ю «_ o t- «_ «, -f 00 <N CN oo CN CN <N CN CN <N CN CN <N CN CN <N CN CN CN CN CN C4 <N 
н н H H н H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
э 
t- «_ t- <N oo o oo 00 o ю УЭ t- <N «_ 00 «э cг> «_ o. -f 00 00 ^l 05 o oc «, -Г) <N CN CN c; CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN <N CN CN CN <N CN CN CN м 
pц н н H н H H H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н "н н н 
э 
I 
00 «_ o. «_ o. -J
1 c. o oo «_ o 00 -f 00 o. 00 o o o «э c. ю o. «_ o -f Cђ 00 o <N CN CN <N CN CN 00 co Cì CN CN CN CN CN CN <N co CN CO CN CN <N CN co <N CN C4 co 
к^ н н н н н H н H н н н н н н н 
1—1 н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
н 00 o 00 o o _H УЭ rH o o -f rH 00 o УЭ rн o rH 00 _н o -H -f o oo rH 00 _н o _н 
tí CO <N co CN co CO co co co co <N CO <N co co CO co <N co co co <N co CN co <N co ĉ  co o н н H H H H H н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н н 
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After reduction we can wrrite 
(x8 0 x10 © x1 6 0 x20)P 0 (xs 0 x1 0 © x1 6 0 x20)P - 0 . (18) 
Relation (18) clearly holds for all P e JC. This implies that (_ ,P ) G K x /C 
is a fix point if and only if (16) is true. After reduction of (16) we obtain the 
following condition for a fix point of GOST-algorithm 
r _ tT30 ~ 26 ~ 25 ~ 24 ffi 23 ~ 22 - 21 ffi 20 - 19 - T16 ffi 15 m 14 
® T A ^ £D, T - 2 /T\ ^ . 1 1 m ™9 T̂N 5 r̂v 4 ^ 3 £TN 2 ^TS /jv -i \ p X v jyX u7«L U7«L U7 «L \±P X \& Jb vj7«L u7 X U7 1 ) i • 
(19) 
Thus we proved next theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Let the key of GOST algorithm be all zeroes string, and all 
S-boxes are identity permutations. Then (_, P) G /C x /C is a fix point of GOST 
algorithm if and only if (19) zs satisfied. 
When zero key and identity permutations (/S-boxes) are in use in GOST-algo-
rithm, then a crucial point of this algorithm is the number of shifts in round 
function rotation. Recall that this is 11 bits rotation to the highest significant 
bit. From analysis of all possible rotations „*, t = 0 , 1 , . . . , 31, as a corollary we 
obtain: 
COROLLARY 1. For any possible rotation xl, t = 0 , 1 , . . . , 31 , there exist 23 2 
fix points. 
In Table 1 we list similar relations to (19) for all possible rotations. 
5. General case 
Here we consider a situation when an arbitrary key and arbitrary S -boxes 
are in use in GOST-algorithm. Finding fix points of GOST-algorithm by our 
approach is a very complicated problem. Already a partial situation, when an 
arbitrary key and identity permutations (S-boxes) are in use, is also compli-
cated. A subkey and a half of a plaintext in a round is mixed using addition 
modulo 232 instead of standard exclusive-or addition. And this is the reason 





F I G U R E 3. Reduction of GOST-algorithm. 
From Figure 2 it is clear that for fix points (i.e. (L ° ,P°) = ( L 7 , P 7 ) ) of 
algorithm GOST in the general case, relation (3) must be satisfied as well. Thus 
we can analyse fix points of the reduced GOST-algorithm. This reduction (see 
Figure 3) consists of 16 rounds of GOST-algorithm. These are rounds from 9 th 
to 24th round. From above it is clear there is a simple bijection between fix 
points of the reduced algorithm GOST and fix points of full GOST-algorithm. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we present a brief proof of existence of 2 3 2 fix points of 
GOST-algorithm when a weak key is in use. Using polynomial analysis we 
described exact form of fix points of algorithm GOST under the condition that 
zero key and identity permutations (S -boxes) are in use. Moreover we showed 
exact form of these fix points not only for 11 bits rotation but for any possible 
rotation in GOST round function. An open problem is the existence and number 
of fix points of GOST-algorithm in general case (i.e. case when arbitrary key 
and arbitrary S-boxes are in use). As a partial result in this case we show a 
reduction of this problem to a problem of finding fix points of 16 rounds of the 
algorithm. 
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